After the bombs
I was wrong to suspect the tube explosions were caused by bombs on the lines. Like most people I'm still trying to get my head around the possible long-term consequences of the bombings being carried out by UK-born suicide bombings. One good bit of news is that the British National Party did badly in a council bye-election in Barking, one of the areas of East London where the stiff-armed tendency have got a hearing for the last 100 years. While Al-Qaeda types try to split us along religious lines, the BNP try it along racial lines. Its all reactionary nonsense in the end though, isn't it?
A book I thoroughly recommend is Jason Burke's Al Qaeda: the True Story of Radical Islam ,published by Penguin, which came out last year. The article below I saw in last Sunday's Observer.
Who did it - and what was their motive?
The world's leading expert on al-Qaeda analyses the mindset of bombers who believe all tactics are justified - and asks what their movement's next step will be
Jason Burke
Sunday July 10, 2005
The Observer
The journey has become wearily familiar. From the office to the airport and then on to places thousands of miles distant where there is pain, grief, death and fear. Last week, though its direction was reversed, its purpose was the same. I flew thousands of miles from somewhere hot and dusty to cover a story in a place where there was pain, grief, death and fear. This time in my own city.
And the questions were the same too: How was this done? Who did it? Why? And what happens next?
The first is the easiest to answer. Someone detonated four bombs, probably made from commercial high explosive, on three tube trains and a bus. Their timers were relatively sophisticated. The bus bomb might have been an accident.
The second question - the identity of the bombers - is harder to answer. When local right-wingers destroyed a government building in Oklahoma 10 years ago, pundits instinctively, and wrongly, blamed Muslim bombers. That said, the prime suspects for last week's atrocity must be radical Islamic militants.
The bombers are likely to be male, though women have become more prominent in recent years in radical Muslim groups. They are likely to be aged between 18 and 30 and in a cell that contains fewer than a dozen active members, possibly only two or three. They will have been closely bound by friendship or family ties or, possibly, shared time in Afghanistan, Iraq or another 'theatre of jihad'. If previous examples are any guide, they were led by one, probably older, individual, with more experience and motivation.
A key issue is their nationality. The most likely scenario involves a mix of recent immigrants and British nationals. In 2001 security services believed the main threat to the UK came from foreign nationals being sent into the country from overseas. Then they focused on immigrants and asylum seekers. More recently, particularly since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the sense has been that British nationals, radicalised and mobilised by hardline propaganda that plays on feelings of alienation and anger, are the greatest menace.
What is certain is that, unlike the 9/11 hijackers, those responsible for the British attacks are not likely to be directly linked to Osama bin Laden and the rump of 'hardcore al-Qaeda' leaders based on the Pakistani-Afghan frontier. The idea that al-Qaeda is a close-knit, tightly structured hierarchical organisation has now been almost completely discounted, at least outside America. If they are Islamic militants, then those behind last week's bombs were acting autonomously. Which brings us to the question of why they did what they did.
With early 'al-Qaeda' attacks, such as that on American embassies in 1998 and even 9/11 itself, the broad motivations of those responsible were clear. Bin Laden made his own agenda clear in a series of public statements. The Islamic world was under attack from a belligerent West set on the domination and humiliation of Muslims, he said, and it was every believer's religious duty to fight back. It was not a case of 'hating freedom', he claimed, but of desiring freedom from supposed American-led oppression. He repeatedly listed the various parts of the world - Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, Afghanistan and, latterly, Iraq - where he felt Muslims were oppressed.
Bin Laden's attacks aimed to radicalise and mobilise the Islamic world. The purpose of holing American warships or destroying the Twin Towers was primarily to scare or damage America, but was also intended to inspire those in the Muslim world who had hitherto rejected his extremist message. Bin Laden realised that many were pleased to see the US wounded and humiliated and went to great lengths to ensure that only targets that would be widely regarded as legitimate were hit. Suicide bombers were an integral part of this strategy, supposedly demonstrating the power and righteousness of their cause by their own self-sacrifice.
But, as bin Laden's grip has loosened, so the bombings have become more indiscriminate and the motives more difficult to perceive. The propaganda content of the strikes has fallen away. Commuters are symbolic of nothing more than the drudgery of going to work.
Those behind the London attacks have no broader strategy. They believe there is a war between right and wrong, faith and falsehood, civilisation and barbarity and that all tactics are justified in the last-ditch struggle to defend what they believe in. They do not see London's population as civilians, but as accomplices to acts of murder and violence.
If they are British, the bombers have long forsaken any national identity and no longer consider themselves as anything other than members of the ummah, the global community of Muslims, on whose behalf they are waging war.
The final question is what happens next? Terrorist movements and insurgencies tend to follow a clear trajectory. Though problems may have been bubbling up for some time, they typically come to public attention with a single major attack. Often those responsible for the strike initially command considerable public support, not least because their organisation and ideology is rooted in long-term grievances familiar to large portions of the population.
Historically, this first attack usually prompts the state security machine, after a short delay or period of indecision, to swing into action. Repressive legislation is introduced, intelligence agencies boosted and key militant leaders are killed or imprisoned. This results in more indiscriminate, brutal violence as the terrorist movement, leaderless and rudderless, mutates and fragments. With resources scarce and security high, soft targets are favoured.
What follows is crucial. Egypt and Algeria suffered Islamic militancies in the early 1990s that followed the above pattern. After nearly a decade of increasing horror, they peaked in grotesque violence. In Algeria, more than 100,000 died. But rather than boost the militants, this had the opposite effect. Public support for extremists collapsed; the 'martyrs' became 'murderers'. Reviled by former supporters, the militants became easy prey for security agencies. Now, only a criminalised rump of violent men remains in both countries. Movements that once threatened the existence of the state are effectively finished. And the critical factor throughout was the support of the bombers' own constituency.
The insurgency labelled 'al-Qaeda' fits this paradigm in many respects. The spectacular attack (9/11), then the response (the Patriot and anti-terrorist Acts, Guantanamo Bay). The degrading of the leadership (the invasion of Afghanistan, thousands of arrests ), now a brutal, indiscriminate phase as individuals buy into a hate-filled ideology (Madrid, the Beslan school massacre, London) and conduct freelance operations.
It may be argued that, as Algeria and Egypt (and Northern Ireland and the Basques) were on a national scale and the 'al-Qaeda insurgency' spans the globe, we are in untrodden territory. But I believe the basic conclusions drawn from smaller-scale examples remain valid. No one can claim, given the diversity of this attack's victims, that they were striking simply at the West. The casualties, in our wonderfully varied city, are as globalised as the ideology that caused them. This is a global militant movement working to an agenda that can inspire or repel anywhere on the planet.
Early last week I was in the Shatila refugee camp in Beirut, where 1,400 Palestinians were massacred in 1982 by Christian gunmen with the tacit consent of the Israelis, and got into a discussion with three brothers. Did they back the executions of Westerners in Iraq? Mohammed said that such deeds were unIslamic and totally unjustified, Bassam maintained that the murders were legitimate given the oppression of Muslims by the West and Hassan was undecided. Hassan's view - and that of his counterpart in Bradford or the East End - is critical. If he decides that the attacks, in Iraq or London, are entirely unjustified, the global 'al-Qaeda' insurgency will wither and die within a decade or so. If he throws in his lot with the militants, we will be plunged into a welter of violence for the foreseeable future.
In our interconnected world, the people who now count most are not our security and emergency services, brave and competent though they are, but the hopes, fears, expectations and views of 1.3 billion Muslims, whether in Beirut, Bradford, London, Riyadh or Kuala Lumpur. They will decide who are martyrs and who are murderers.
A book I thoroughly recommend is Jason Burke's Al Qaeda: the True Story of Radical Islam ,published by Penguin, which came out last year. The article below I saw in last Sunday's Observer.
Who did it - and what was their motive?
The world's leading expert on al-Qaeda analyses the mindset of bombers who believe all tactics are justified - and asks what their movement's next step will be
Jason Burke
Sunday July 10, 2005
The Observer
The journey has become wearily familiar. From the office to the airport and then on to places thousands of miles distant where there is pain, grief, death and fear. Last week, though its direction was reversed, its purpose was the same. I flew thousands of miles from somewhere hot and dusty to cover a story in a place where there was pain, grief, death and fear. This time in my own city.
And the questions were the same too: How was this done? Who did it? Why? And what happens next?
The first is the easiest to answer. Someone detonated four bombs, probably made from commercial high explosive, on three tube trains and a bus. Their timers were relatively sophisticated. The bus bomb might have been an accident.
The second question - the identity of the bombers - is harder to answer. When local right-wingers destroyed a government building in Oklahoma 10 years ago, pundits instinctively, and wrongly, blamed Muslim bombers. That said, the prime suspects for last week's atrocity must be radical Islamic militants.
The bombers are likely to be male, though women have become more prominent in recent years in radical Muslim groups. They are likely to be aged between 18 and 30 and in a cell that contains fewer than a dozen active members, possibly only two or three. They will have been closely bound by friendship or family ties or, possibly, shared time in Afghanistan, Iraq or another 'theatre of jihad'. If previous examples are any guide, they were led by one, probably older, individual, with more experience and motivation.
A key issue is their nationality. The most likely scenario involves a mix of recent immigrants and British nationals. In 2001 security services believed the main threat to the UK came from foreign nationals being sent into the country from overseas. Then they focused on immigrants and asylum seekers. More recently, particularly since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the sense has been that British nationals, radicalised and mobilised by hardline propaganda that plays on feelings of alienation and anger, are the greatest menace.
What is certain is that, unlike the 9/11 hijackers, those responsible for the British attacks are not likely to be directly linked to Osama bin Laden and the rump of 'hardcore al-Qaeda' leaders based on the Pakistani-Afghan frontier. The idea that al-Qaeda is a close-knit, tightly structured hierarchical organisation has now been almost completely discounted, at least outside America. If they are Islamic militants, then those behind last week's bombs were acting autonomously. Which brings us to the question of why they did what they did.
With early 'al-Qaeda' attacks, such as that on American embassies in 1998 and even 9/11 itself, the broad motivations of those responsible were clear. Bin Laden made his own agenda clear in a series of public statements. The Islamic world was under attack from a belligerent West set on the domination and humiliation of Muslims, he said, and it was every believer's religious duty to fight back. It was not a case of 'hating freedom', he claimed, but of desiring freedom from supposed American-led oppression. He repeatedly listed the various parts of the world - Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, Afghanistan and, latterly, Iraq - where he felt Muslims were oppressed.
Bin Laden's attacks aimed to radicalise and mobilise the Islamic world. The purpose of holing American warships or destroying the Twin Towers was primarily to scare or damage America, but was also intended to inspire those in the Muslim world who had hitherto rejected his extremist message. Bin Laden realised that many were pleased to see the US wounded and humiliated and went to great lengths to ensure that only targets that would be widely regarded as legitimate were hit. Suicide bombers were an integral part of this strategy, supposedly demonstrating the power and righteousness of their cause by their own self-sacrifice.
But, as bin Laden's grip has loosened, so the bombings have become more indiscriminate and the motives more difficult to perceive. The propaganda content of the strikes has fallen away. Commuters are symbolic of nothing more than the drudgery of going to work.
Those behind the London attacks have no broader strategy. They believe there is a war between right and wrong, faith and falsehood, civilisation and barbarity and that all tactics are justified in the last-ditch struggle to defend what they believe in. They do not see London's population as civilians, but as accomplices to acts of murder and violence.
If they are British, the bombers have long forsaken any national identity and no longer consider themselves as anything other than members of the ummah, the global community of Muslims, on whose behalf they are waging war.
The final question is what happens next? Terrorist movements and insurgencies tend to follow a clear trajectory. Though problems may have been bubbling up for some time, they typically come to public attention with a single major attack. Often those responsible for the strike initially command considerable public support, not least because their organisation and ideology is rooted in long-term grievances familiar to large portions of the population.
Historically, this first attack usually prompts the state security machine, after a short delay or period of indecision, to swing into action. Repressive legislation is introduced, intelligence agencies boosted and key militant leaders are killed or imprisoned. This results in more indiscriminate, brutal violence as the terrorist movement, leaderless and rudderless, mutates and fragments. With resources scarce and security high, soft targets are favoured.
What follows is crucial. Egypt and Algeria suffered Islamic militancies in the early 1990s that followed the above pattern. After nearly a decade of increasing horror, they peaked in grotesque violence. In Algeria, more than 100,000 died. But rather than boost the militants, this had the opposite effect. Public support for extremists collapsed; the 'martyrs' became 'murderers'. Reviled by former supporters, the militants became easy prey for security agencies. Now, only a criminalised rump of violent men remains in both countries. Movements that once threatened the existence of the state are effectively finished. And the critical factor throughout was the support of the bombers' own constituency.
The insurgency labelled 'al-Qaeda' fits this paradigm in many respects. The spectacular attack (9/11), then the response (the Patriot and anti-terrorist Acts, Guantanamo Bay). The degrading of the leadership (the invasion of Afghanistan, thousands of arrests ), now a brutal, indiscriminate phase as individuals buy into a hate-filled ideology (Madrid, the Beslan school massacre, London) and conduct freelance operations.
It may be argued that, as Algeria and Egypt (and Northern Ireland and the Basques) were on a national scale and the 'al-Qaeda insurgency' spans the globe, we are in untrodden territory. But I believe the basic conclusions drawn from smaller-scale examples remain valid. No one can claim, given the diversity of this attack's victims, that they were striking simply at the West. The casualties, in our wonderfully varied city, are as globalised as the ideology that caused them. This is a global militant movement working to an agenda that can inspire or repel anywhere on the planet.
Early last week I was in the Shatila refugee camp in Beirut, where 1,400 Palestinians were massacred in 1982 by Christian gunmen with the tacit consent of the Israelis, and got into a discussion with three brothers. Did they back the executions of Westerners in Iraq? Mohammed said that such deeds were unIslamic and totally unjustified, Bassam maintained that the murders were legitimate given the oppression of Muslims by the West and Hassan was undecided. Hassan's view - and that of his counterpart in Bradford or the East End - is critical. If he decides that the attacks, in Iraq or London, are entirely unjustified, the global 'al-Qaeda' insurgency will wither and die within a decade or so. If he throws in his lot with the militants, we will be plunged into a welter of violence for the foreseeable future.
In our interconnected world, the people who now count most are not our security and emergency services, brave and competent though they are, but the hopes, fears, expectations and views of 1.3 billion Muslims, whether in Beirut, Bradford, London, Riyadh or Kuala Lumpur. They will decide who are martyrs and who are murderers.
posted by Anglonoel | 4:21 pm
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